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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction in this Court is appropriate pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 § 78A-3-102(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
ISSUE #1: The trial court erred in ruling that Appellees/Cross-Appellants Alan, 
Suzy and Aidan Reighard (collectively, the "Reighards") were not the prevailing parties 
in this matter and in denying the Reighards their attorney's fees and costs, including 
expert witness expenses. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness. {Dejavue, Inc. v. US. Energy Corp., 1999 UT 
App 355, T|8, 993 P.2d 222, 225.) A court's award of costs is within its sound discretion, 
and is reviewed to determine if the trial court exceeded its permitted range of discretion. 
(Alpha Partners v. Transamerica Investment Management, 2006 UT App 331, ^fl7, 153 
P.3d714, 719.) 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised by the Reighards in 
their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Award 
of Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs, filed on or about October 13, 2009. (R.1454). 
ISSUE #2: The trial court erred in reducing the amount of the jury's verdict and 
interim judgment to the Reighards from $12,500 to $7,500. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's reduction of a judgment is reviewed 
for correctness. (Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91,1f 9, 103 P.3d 135, 139.) 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised by the Reighards in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. Yates's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, or in the Alternative, For Reduction of the Jury's Verdict, filed on or about 
November 2, 2009. (R.1524). 
ISSUE #3: The trial court erred by not re-opening the judgment entered on the 
jury's verdict and thereafter directing the entry of judgment in the Reighards' favor on 
their Breach of Contract and Negligent Misrepresentation causes of action against 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Steven Yates ("Mr. Yates") in addition to their Negligence 
cause of action. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be 
granted when the losing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and a trial 
court's reduction of a judgment is reviewed for correctness. {Hansen v. Stewart, 761 
P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).) 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised by the Reighards in 
their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Partial Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for Additur, filed on or about October 
20,2009. (R.1497). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah R. Civ. P. 68. Settlement Offers 
(a) Unless otherwise specified, an offer made under this rule is an offer to resolve 
all claims in the action between the parties to the date of the offer, including costs, 
interest and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees, (b) If the 
adjusted award is not more favorable than the offer, the offeror is not liable for costs, 
prejudgment interest or attorney fees incurred by the offeree after the offer, and the 
offeree shall pay the offeror's costs incurred after the offer. The court may suspend the 
application of this rule to prevent manifest injustice, (c) An offer made under this rule 
shall: (c)(1) be in writing; (c)(2) expressly refer to this rule; (c)(3) be made more than 10 
days before trial; (c)(4) remain open for at least 10 days; and (c)(5) be served on the 
offeree under Rule 5. Acceptance of the offer shall be in writing and served on the offeror 
under Rule 5. Upon acceptance, either party may file the offer and acceptance with a 
proposed judgment under Rule 58A. (d) "Adjusted award" means the amount awarded 
by the finder of fact and, unless excluded by the offer, the offeree's costs and interest 
incurred before the offer, and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract and not 
excluded by the offer, the offeree's reasonable attorney fees incurred before the offer. If 
the offeree's attorney fees are subject to a contingency fee agreement, the court shall 
determine a reasonable attorney fee for the period preceding the offer. 
Utah R. Civ P. 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any 
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the 
report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they 
are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When 
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or 
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment, (c)(1) Generally, Except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; 
and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the 
parties on each side as between or among themselves, (c)(2) Judgment by default. A 
judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that 
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs, (d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course 
to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an 
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall 
be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. (d)(2) How assessed. The party who 
claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse 
party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum 
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the 
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. A 
memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to 
the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry 
of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is 
entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in 
any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that 
purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This underlying action arises out of the negligent construction by Mr. Yates, the 
builder, general contractor and seller of a single-family residence currently owned and 
occupied by the Reighards, located at 2478 Daybreaker Drive, Park City, Utah ("the 
Residence"). 
Mr. Yates owned the lot upon which he built the Residence, admittedly acting as 
the general contractor as reflected on the applicable building permit for the Residence 
and as conceded in Mr. Yates' Answer, deposition testimony and written discovery 
responses. Mr. Yates was a licensed general contractor, a role he admittedly undertook 
on at least eight-nine of the prior houses he owned, built, lived in and ultimately sold to 
various purchasers. Upon completion of the Residence in November 2001, Mr. Yates 
moved in and lived in it for approximately 2.2 years. During that time, Mr. Yates put the 
house on the market in 2003 and failed to sell it. He put the Residence on the market 
again in early 2004, selling it in roughly February 2004 to the Reighards. 
Mr. Yates, as the general contractor, failed to construct the Residence per the 
applicable standard of care in the industry for general contractors responsible for 
supervising the means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures of construction. 
The substandard workmanship and various building code violations relating to stucco 
application, window installation, sequencing of the construction work and drainage 
resulting from Mr, Yates' failures as a general contractor, were never disclosed to the 
Reighards when they purchased the Residence from Mr. Yates in February 2004. Such 
disclosures were required in the applicable Purchase/Sale and Disclosure documents. 
In approximately August 2006, the Reighards noticed for the first time 
considerable mold, dry rot and other deterioration in the windows and walls of certain 
areas of the first floor. Upon further inspection and destructive testing and remediation 
of those areas, it was discovered that the means, methods, techniques, sequences and 
procedures of the original construction for the stucco, windows, drainage and 
surrounding areas was improper and clearly the cause of water intrusion into the 
Residence and specifically but not limited to framing members and other components of 
the building materials used to construct the Residence. 
The result of the water infiltration was mold and dry rot, not only affecting the 
Residence itself, but its occupants, Alan and Suzy Reighard, and their then 18-month old 
son Aidan, who had been experiencing inexplicable physical illnesses prior to the 
discovery of the mold and dry rot. Clearly, all of the dry rot and mold needed to be 
removed, remediated and replaced with proper construction methods and materials to not 
only repair the damaged windows and frames and surrounding stucco, but to prevent 
further water intrusion from occurring. The Reighards had to not only treat and repair the 
resulting conditions, but the cause of those conditions as well, which meant that the 
stucco, building paper, windows, flashing and drainage all had to be torn out, re-applied 
and installed correctly so as to prevent the same conditions from occurring again. 
The Reighards moved out of the house and the remediation work was started 
shortly after the Reighards discovered the conditions in August 2006. The remediation 
work was completed within roughly two months. The Reighards had the repair work 
reviewed and tested to confirm for their peace of mind that the repairs worked, and in fact 
there have been no further problems with the Residence since completion of the repair 
work in late 2006. Additionally, and fortunately, Alan and Aidan Reighards' symptoms 
and physical illnesses that existed prior to the discovery of the mold and dry rot have not 
re-surfaced. 
Mr. Yates, the builder/seller, failed to disclose the numerous areas of substandard 
workmanship and Uniform Building Code violations as required in the applicable 
Purchase/Sale and Disclosure documents. The Reighards claimed property damage to the 
Residence and personal injuries to Alan and Aidan Reighard as a result of the 
substandard workmanship, code violations, and Mr. Yates's failure to disclose the 
substandard workmanship and code violations. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Beginning on or about September 20, 2006, and through a series of letters, the 
Reighards attempted to resolve this matter with Mr. Yates informally and without court 
intervention. (R. 1454-1472 and Exhibits 3 through 8 thereto). Those efforts were 
rebuked by both Mr. Yates and his counsel and eventually failed. On or about February 
1, 2007, the Reighards filed a Complaint1 against Mr. Yates claiming property damage to 
the Residence and personal injuries to Alan and Aidan Reighard as a result of the 
substandard workmanship, code violations, and Mr. Yates' failure to disclose said 
1
 Counsel for Mr. Yates makes a point to note in the Brief of Appellant that while Suzy 
Reighard's brother, Daniel S. Drage, filed the Complaint, Ms. Reighard's sister, Christine 
E. Drage, "who is a California attorney," appeared Pro Hac Vice on behalf of the 
Reighards. In fact, Ms. Drage is a licensed attorney in both California and Nevada who 
graduated from Brigham Young University Law School. Counsel for Mr. Yates further 
asserts that Ms. Drage's "California associate," Trevor Resurreccion, filed most of the 
pleadings in this matter. Mr. Resurreccion was also admitted Pro Hac Vice on behalf of 
the Reighards in this matter, Mr. Resurreccion is a licensed attorney in both California 
and Nevada, and while Mr. Resurreccion signed most of the "pleadings," these statements 
by counsel for Mr. Yates have no relevance to the present appeal. 
substandard workmanship and code violations for (i) negligence; (ii) breach of contract; 
(iii) breach of express warranty; (iv) negligent misrepresentation; (v) fraudulent 
misrepresentation; (vi) fraudulent concealment; and (vii) fraudulent non-disclosure. 
(R.001). 
On April 7, 2008, Mr. Yates filed the following Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment: (1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Negligence (R.309); (2) Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Breach of Contract and Breach of Express Warranty 
(R.316); and (3) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Negligent Misrepresentation, 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Concealment, and Fraudulent Nondisclosure 
(R.326.) The Reighards opposed each of the motions. (R.397-415, 416-437, and 438-
455, respectively.) 
On or about June 16, 2008, the trial court issued its Ruling and Order denying all 
three of the Mr. Yates's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, providing a very 
thorough, well reasoned and clear Ruling explaining the basis for the denial. (R.770-
785.) In the Ruling, the trial court held that, "Yates built the home, lived in it and then 
sold it directly to plaintiffs, and so he has a direct relationship with plaintiffs as buyers 
and thus may owe them a duty in both contract and tort. The court will not dismiss 
plaintiffs negligence claim based on defendant's request because Yates owed plaintiffs a 
duty of care as the builder/contractor/seller of the home." (R.777-778) (emphasis added). 
On June 24, 2008, the Reighards served Mr. Yates with a statutory Offer to 
Compromise ("Offer") pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 68 in the amount of 
$5,000. (R.1454-1472 at Exhibit "2" attached thereto). Mr. Yates never accepted the 
Offer, and therefore it was deemed rejected by him by operation of law. 
A four-day jury trial was held from September 29 to October 2, 2009. Prior to the 
case being submitted to the jury, all but three claims against Mr. Yates were dismissed: 
the Reighards' causes of action for negligence; breach of contract; and negligent 
misrepresentation. (R. 1444-1449). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Reighards 
on their Negligence cause of action in the amount of $10,000 for Economic Loss, 
including Property Damage to the Residence, and $2,500 for Non-Economic Loss, 
including pain and suffering, for a total of $12,500. (R. 1444-1449). The Reighards were 
awarded the only monetary relief in this action. 
After the verdict was entered, the Reighards timely filed a partial motion 
notwithstanding the verdict and memorandum in support requesting that the court re-open 
the interim judgment entered on the jury's verdict to direct the entry of judgment in the 
Reighards' favor on their Breach of Contract and Negligent Misrepresentation causes of 
action against Mr. Yates in addition to their Negligence cause of action. (R. 1495-1506.) 
The Reighards also timely filed a post-trial motion for attorney's fees and costs, including 
expert witness expenses, and memorandum in support as they were the prevailing party in 
this litigation. (R. 1450-1472). The Reighards filed a verified memorandum of costs in 
conjunction with their post-trial motion for attorney's fees and costs.(R.1473-1477). 
Both motions were denied. (R. 1624-1640). 
The Reighards opposed Mr. Yates' motion to reduce the jury's verdict by $5,000 
pursuant to a settlement the Reighards entered into with a third-party (stucco contractor 
E. Marshall Plastering) related to the construction of the Residence. (R. 1524-1529) 
Opposition). The trial court granted Mr. Yates' motion in part, and reduced the Reighards 
verdict to $7,500. (R. 1624-1640). After the Reighards submitted their verified 
memorandum of costs, the trial court prepared an Amended Judgment in favor of the 
Reighards in the amount of $7,500 plus $2,919.25 in costs for a total judgment of 
$10,419.25. (R.1672-1673). To date, no amount, whatsoever, of the $10,419.25 
judgment has been paid to the Reighards. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Mr. Yates obtained a general contractor's license in the State of Utah 
approximately 25 to 30 years ago. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 10, In 9-20). 
2. Mr. Yates personally constructed 18 to 25 projects, including 9 to 11 
residential projects, in his 25-30 year career as a general contractor. Prior to beginning 
construction on the Residence, Mr. Yates acted as general contractor on eight or nine 
residential projects. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at, p.l 1-12.) 
3. Mr. Yates testified that it is not the responsibility of a general contractor to 
supervise the means of the work provided by the subcontractors, and it was not Mr. 
Yates' responsibility to watch over a subcontractor. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto 
at p. 17). 
4. Further, Mr. Yates stated that a general contractor is not responsible for 
supervising the means, methods, techniques and procedures of construction. (R.397-415 
and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 17). 
5. Mr. Yates testified that in his capacity as a general contractor, he was not 
responsible for supervising the worksmanship of his various subcontractors as long as 
those subcontractors were licensed with the State of Utah. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," 
thereto at p. 18). 
6. Mr. Yates acted as the builder, general contractor and seller of the 
Residence to the Reighards. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 20, In 10-12). 
7. Mr. Yates started construction of the Residence in July or August of 2000 
and was intimately involved in the preparation of the plans and specifications of the 
Residence. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 25, In 11-24). 
8. Mr. Yates lived at the Residence full-time from the date of the certificate of 
occupancy in November 2001 through the purchase of home by Plaintiffs in March 2004. 
(R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 71, In 16-22) 
9. During that time, Mr. Yates put the Residence on the market in 2003 but 
failed to sell it at that time. He put the Residence on the market again in early 2004, 
selling it in roughly February 2004 to the Reighards. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto 
at p. 71-72). 
10. On or about February 5, 2004 Mr. Yates and the Reighards entered into the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC"). (Exhibit 1 to Addendum of Brief of Appellant.) 
11. As part of the Real Estate Purchase Contract, Mr. Yates executed a Seller's 
Property Condition Disclosure ("the Seller's Disclosure"), including that there were no 
building code violations at the Residence. (Exhibit 1 to Addendum of Brief of Appellant.) 
12. The Reighards relied upon the representations and disclosures made by Mr. 
Yates, including those made in the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Seller's 
Disclosures, and would not have purchased the Residence if they were made aware of the 
construction defects and problems with the Residence that they discovered during 
remediation. (R.473-477 atffil 15-20). 
13. In approximately August 2006, the Reighards noticed for the first time 
considerable mold and dry rot and other deterioration in the windows and walls of certain 
areas of the first floor. (R.473-477 at f 5). 
14. Upon discovery of the mold, the Reighards informed Mr. Yates of the 
problems at the Residence and invited him to the Residence before RAM Builders, a 
stucco remediation contractor, commenced its work, but during the remediation process. 
(R.473-477 at 1f 11). 
15. The Reighards had to make numerous repairs to the Residence, including 
but not limited to: re-stucco the residence at a substantial cost; costs associated with the 
retention of a mold sampling company; mold remediation; costs associate with inside 
dry wall, painting, window replacement throughout (one window frame was completely 
destroyed by the mold); scrape landscaping slope away from the Residence; re-landscaping; 
additional costs and expenses associated with repairing all areas of substandard 
workmanship and resultant damage. (R.473-477 at f^ 13). 
16. Starting in approximately late 2005 through August 2006 (when the mold 
was discovered and Plaintiffs left the Residence), Alan Reighard experienced the 
following physical symptoms: headaches, fevers, sweating, pressure pain in ears, 
congestion, hoarse voice, sinus pain, drenching sweats and allergic reactions. (R.478-482 
at H 13). 
17. When Plaintiffs left the Residence after the discovery of the mold, Alan 
Reighard's symptoms subsided. His symptoms also subsided when he left the Residence 
for extended periods of time (i.e., more than a day at a time). (R.478-482 at ^ f 13). 
18. Aidan Reighard experienced the following physical symptoms starting in 
approximately late 2005 through August 2006: allergic reactions, including severe black 
eyes and rashes on his face, arms, legs and back, as well as congestion. (R.478-482 at <| 
13). 
19. Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Eugene Cole testified at trial that he is qualified to 
provide opinions as to the effect of mold on a particular individual or set of individuals. 
(R.1700atp.l2-13). 
20. Dr. Eugene Cole testified at trial that his practice consists of at most 2% of 
expert witness work. (R.1700 at p.23). 
21. Further, Dr. Cole also confirmed that the exposure to the Reighards to such 
a degraded air quality in the Residence caused or substantially contributed to adverse and 
chronic health effects exhibited by Alan and Aidan Reighard and for which they sought 
medical care and treatment over a meaningful period of time. (R.1700 at p. 36). 
22. Plaintiffs5 expert Dr. Eugene Cole reviewed documentation of chronic 
moisture intrusion into the Residence, which resulted in microbial (bacterial and mold) 
growth and amplification that resulted in the degradation of structural and finishing 
materials which subsequently degraded the air quality within the Residence. (R.461-464 
at If 4). 
23. Dr. Cole further affirmed that the investigative mold contamination and 
remediation reports and associated photographs provided to him for review 
overwhelmingly confirm the presence of a severely altered microbial ecology with 
significant sources of mold contamination resulting from chronic moisture intrusion into, 
and probable migration within, the Reighard Residence. (R.461-464 at f 6). 
24. Alan and Aiden Reighard both responded positively, that is with 
diminished health effects and corresponding symptom relief, following their absence 
from the Residence during the remediation and then after reoccupation of the Residence 
following reconstruction. (R.461-464 at ^  6). 
25. Dr. Brian Drage testified that since the remediation of the Residence in 
November 2006, he has never seen Alan Reighard, as his primary care physician, with 
symptoms as severe and serious as they were in 2005 and 2006. (R.1700 at p. 61). 
26. Dr. Drage testified that Aidan was tested for common household molds, not 
outside molds or stachybotris, and such tests came back negative. (R.1700 at p. 60). 
27. Mr. Yates has no idea whether or not the windows at the Residence were 
properly flashed, and Mr. Yates has never been personally involved in determining 
appropriate methods for flashing windows. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 
110, In 1-20.) 
28. Mr. Yates did not familiarize himself with the Utah building code 
requirements prior to commencing construction of the Residence. (R.397-415 and 
Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 127-128). 
is 
29. Mr. Yates personally installed the landscaping at the Residence, and he 
determined whether or not the slope used for the Residence and the landscaping was 
appropriate by making sure that everything drained away from the home. (R.397-415 
and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 179-180). 
30. Mr. Yates personally installed the sprinkler system at the Residence. 
(R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 183, In 4-7). 
31. Mr. Yates failed to hire any type of civil engineer to determine whether the 
drainage at the Residence was appropriate. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 
183, In 19-21). 
32. Mr. Yates determined the appropriate slope for the landscaping at the 
Residence by "eyeballing" where it was draining away from the home. (R.397-415 and 
Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 187, In 20-23). 
33. The west side grades of the finished surface at the Residence are extremely 
flat and sloping towards the building. Also, it is obvious that north side grades at the 
Residence slope towards the building. Due to this improper grading of the lot, the run-off 
of water drains towards the building. (R.468-472 at ^ 8). 
34. The above deficiencies in the construction of the house and the surrounding 
grading fall below the applicable standard of care and also violate the building code. 
(R.468-472 at ^9). 
35. Plaintiffs' expert, Charles Dixon, conducted several tests for mold at 
Dio;^ ;ffo> D ^ ; d e n c e . (R.390-392 at If 4). 
36. Dr. Cole reviewed and analyzed Charles Dixon's reports/tests for mold at 
the Residence and relied on such reports in making his opinions. (R.1700 at p. 15 and p. 
39-43). 
37. Plaintiffs' expert, Shaan Sanderson, investigated of the components of the 
stucco system at the Residence and concluded that the contractor failed to install an 
exterior insulation finish stucco system with proper water management—it had several 
missing components and others that were installed incorrectly. (R.456-460 at <[ 5). 
38. As the general contractor, Mr. Yates should have supervised the work of his 
subcontractors on the project while constructing the Residence, including means, 
methods, techniques, and sequences. (R.456-460 at f 16). 
39. Shaan Sanderson determined almost instantly after RAM Builders started 
remediation work on the Residence that the moisture barrier was not installed correctly 
and that the window flashings were not installed correctly; also, there was no backer rod 
or caulking around the doors and windows. (R.1700 at p. 77), 
40. Sanderson testified that it is a building code violation when the stucco 
system does not have backer rod and sealant. (R.1700 at p. 78). 
41. In fact, the backer rod and caulking were missing from all windows and 
doors in the stucco system at the entire Residence. (R.1700 at p. 81-82). 
42. Sanderson testified that the fact that the grading in the back yard of the 
Residence is up close or in contact with the stucco system is a building code violation 
which contributed to the water intrusion to the house. (R. 1700 at p. 81). 
43. Shaan Sanderson testified that he recommended to the Reighards that they 
remove the faulty stucco system and install a new stucco system. (R. 1700 at p. 103). 
44. RAM Builders commenced work on the Residence in late September 2006. 
(R.1700atp. 111). 
45. Sanderson testified that if the stucco system at the Residence was properly 
installed originally, it would withstand overspray from the adjacent sprinklers. (R.1700 
at p. 117). 
46. Mr. Yates retained absolutely no expert witnesses related to residential 
construction in his defense of Plaintiffs' claims in the underlying litigation. (See 
generally Record and Brief of Appellant). 
47. Subsequent to the purchase of the Residence and before the discovery of 
the mold infestation, the Reighards made minor repairs to the sprinkler system in a few 
locations, none of which caused significant amounts of water to pond around the exterior 
of the Residence. (R.473-477 at ^ 7). 
48. Prior to the discovery of mold at the Residence in August 2006, the 
Reighards also hired Park City Nursery to plant trees around the Residence, but they did 
not change the grading around the Residence. (R.473-477 at^ f 8). 
49. On or about March 24, 2008, Mr. Yates filed (i) a Motion in Limine to 
Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Brian Gary Drage (R.213-215); (ii) a Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Testimony of Sattar N. Tabriz, P.E. R.L.S., Zia Yasrobi, P.E., Kurt Salomon and 
Charles Dixon, M.S.P.H. C.I.H.(R.224-226); and (iii) a Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Testimony of Shaan Sanderson (R.241-243). The Reighards opposed the motions. 
(R.262-263, 273-282, and 264-272, respectively). 
50. On or about June 19, 2008, the trial court issued a Ruling and Order 
denying all three of Mr. Yates' Motions in Limine in their entirety. (R.770-785). 
51. On or about April 28, 2008, Mr. Yates filed a Motion to Strike Affidavits of 
Sattar N. Tabriz, P.E. R.L.S., Zia Yasrobi, P.E., Shaan Sanderson, and Eugene C. Cole, 
DrPH. (R.510-512). The Reighards opposed the motion (R.551-556). 
52. On or about June 19, 2008, the trial court issued a Ruling and Order 
denying Mr. Yates' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Sattar N. Tabriz, P.E. R.L.S., Zia 
Yasrobi, P.E., Shaan Sanderson, and Eugene C. Cole, DrPH.. (R.770-785). 
53. On or about April 14, 2008, Mr. Yates filed a Motion to Strike the 
Declaration of Plaintiff Suzy Reighard. (R.346-348). The Reighards opposed same. 
(R.379-383). 
54. On or about June 19, 2008, the trial court issued a Ruling and Order 
denying Mr. Yates' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Plaintiff Suzy Reighard. (R.770-
785). 
55. There was no special instruction given to the jury (or offered by Mr. Yates) 
that causation of personal injury damages has to be proved by a reasonable medical 
certainty. (R. 1400-1443). 
56. Mr. Yates' expert, Dr. Cheung testified that he did not review any 
photographs of the mold in the Residence, nor did he ask to review any photographs of 
mold in the house (R. 1701 at p. 155). 
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57. Dr. Hung Cheung admitted that there was mold in the Residence. (R. 1701 
at p. 155). 
58. When shown a photograph of the mold that existed in the Residence, Dr. 
Cheung testified that in his professional opinion, the mold in the Reighards' residence 
needed to be removed from the Residence. (R.1701 at p. 155). 
59. Dr. Cheung testified that the mix of molds that Allan and Aidan Reighard 
were tested for did not include a Stachybotrys mold. (R.1701 at p. 159). 
60. Mr. Yates failed to file a memorandum of costs with the trial court. (See 
generally Record). 
61. Mr. Yates failed to file a motion for attorney's fees with the trial court. (See 
generally Record). 
62. Mr. Yates initially filed a Third-Party Complaint against E. Marshall 
Plastering, the stucco subcontractor at the Residence, on or about November 16, 2007. 
(R.97-121). 
63. On or about July 3, 2008, Mr. Yates and E. Marshall Plastering filed a joint 
motion to dismiss E. Marshall Plastering from this litigation, and E. Marshall Plastering 
was thereafter dismissed. (R.838-841). 
64. E. Marshall Plastering was not listed on the jury's Special Verdict form for 
any of the Reighards' causes of action. (R. 1444-1449). 
65. Mr. Yates did not call any expert witnesses regarding construction or stucco 
installation. (See generally Record). 
66. The jury never determined any allocation of damages related to the various 
defect claims and potentially implicated subcontractors (i.e., stucco, framing, window 
installation, window manufacture). (R. 1444-1449). 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO ISSUES RAISED IN BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. AS BUILDER, GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND SELLER OF THE 
RESIDENCE, MR. YATES OWED AN INDEPENDENT DUTY TO THE 
REIGHARDS AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT MR. 
YATES OWED SUCH A DUTY 
It is undisputed that Mr. Yates acted as the builder, general contractor and seller of 
the Residence to the Reighards. In that role, Mr. Yates owed a duty to the Reighards 
beyond anything they contractually agreed to pursuant to the REPC. "As always, 
resolution of this issue begins with an examination of the legal relationships between the 
parties, followed by an analysis of the duties created by these relationships." (Loveland 
v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah 1987).) 
Duty is a policy determination. The trial court, in previously finding that a duty 
exists between Mr. Yates and the Reighards, noted that duty is a question of law which 
grows out of the relationship between the parties and the duties created by that 
relationship. (R.776-777, quoting Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App. 101,1f1f34-35 (citing 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47,1fl[14-15).) 
In order to protect unsophisticated purchasers, a builder has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in constructing a residence, and has a duty to disclose any information 
which he knows or reasonably ought to know concerning construction defects. (Smith v. 
Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, \ 16, 94 P.3d 919, 924.) Therefore, Mr. Yates had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in constructing the Residence. 
Further, "[T]he law imputes to builders and contractors a high degree of 
specialized knowledge and expertise with regard to residential construction." (Frandsen 
at U 18 (citing McDonald v Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283, 1292 (1979) 
("Whether the builder be large or small, the purchaser relies upon his superior knowledge 
and skill, and he impliedly represents that he is qualified to erect a habitable dwelling. 
He is also in a better position to prevent the existence of major defects."); Groffv. Pete 
KingsleyBldg., Inc., 374 Pa.Super. 377, 543 A.2d 128, 133 (1998) ('The professional 
builder is expected to have the skill and expertise to know how to guard against potential 
structural problems. Moreover, the builder is in the best position to prevent structural 
defects."); Moxley v. Laramine Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979) 
("Consumer protection demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely on the skill 
of the builder and that the house is constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended 
use.").). 
This Court recently recognized a duty between a builder-contractor and a home 
buyer in Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d. 283. The duty of the 
builder-contractor in the context of a direct action for recovery brought by a home buyer 
is well recognized. The disparity in skill and knowledge between home buyers and 
builder-contractors leads buyers to rely on the builder-contractor's expertise. {Id. at \ 
24). Yazd bolsters the Reighards claim that Mr. Yates owed them a duty, because, like 
Yazd, this litigation involves a builder-contractor and home buyer. 
In Moore v. Smith, the Court of Appeals relied on Yazd's holding that a seller's 
status as a builder-contractor gave rise to a seller's legal duty to home buyers to find that 
a contractor who had lived in a house and sold the house "as is," owed the buyers a duty. 
(2007 UT App. 101 at f35.) Moore establishes that builder-contractors owe certain 
duties to the purchasers of the homes they build. 
Mr. Yates' argument that he owes no duty to Plaintiffs because they never hired 
him as a contractor is meritless. Notably, Mr. Yates cites no authority to this proposition. 
Mr. Yates had a duty to meet the standard of care applicable to a general contractor when 
he took it upon himself to personally act as general contractor in constructing the 
Residence. Mr. Yates was in the superior position as the builder, general contractor and 
seller with no intermediate purchaser, to know of the defects in the Residence, which he 
failed to disclose. 
Since Mr. Yates built the Residence, lived in it and then sold it directly to the 
Reighards, he had a direct relationship with the Reighards as buyers, contractual and 
otherwise, and thus owes them a duty in both contract and tort. The Reighards relied on 
Mr. Yates' status as the builder, general contractor and seller of the Residence in deciding 
to purchase it. The Reighards were not "remote purchasers" of the Residence, as they 
were in direct contractual privity with Mr. Yates. 
In his capacity as owner/general contractor/seller of the Residence to the 
Reighards, Mr. Yates owed a legal duty to the Reighards regardless of the period of time 
he himself lived in the house that he built and ultimately sold to the Reighards. One of 
Mr. Yates's arguments is that any legal duty Mr. Yates may have owed to the Reighards 
as a general contractor was somehow terminated due to the period of time that elapsed 
between when Mr. Yates completed construction and moved in (roughly November, 
2001) and the time he sold the Residence to the Reighards in February 2004. The trial 
court clearly rejected that argument in its Ruling. (R.777). This situation is of particular 
importance in the current economic downturn. Undoubtedly, many builders have decided 
to "sit" on homes that have been constructed until such time as the sale may be more 
profitable. This is exactly what Mr. Yates did. This election to wait to sell a home does 
not terminate the existence of a duty. 
Mr. Yates has conceded the substandard construction of the Residence, as 
evidence by his lack of designation of any experts on the subject, as well as his own self-
defeating testimony. He admitted that when he determined the slope of the landscaping 
at the Residence, he "just eyeballed where it was draining away from the home." (R.397-
415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at p. 187, In 20-23). Mr. Yates also admitted that he did not 
supervise his subcontractors in the construction of the Residence or determine whether 
the subcontractors were performing their services pursuant to any industry standard of 
care. (R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at pp. 17-18,96, 103, 108, 119-126, 130-132, 
157, 187-188.) 
Therefore, Mr. Yates owed the Reighards an independent duty, the trial court did 
not err in holding that such a duty existed, and the Reighards' Negligence cause of action 
was properly submitted to the jury. 
II. THE REIGHARDS' NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY 
ALLOWED TO PROCEED TO THE JURY, EVEN UNDER DA VENCOURT, AND 
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IS INAPPLICABLE 
Mr. Yates seeks to set aside the jury's verdict with a ruling that is wholly 
inconsistent with the relevant facts and controlling case law. Mr. Yates's argument to set 
aside the jury's award to the Reighards on their negligence cause of action is purportedly 
derived from the recent case of Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing HO A v. Davencourt at 
Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65. However, Davencourt actually affirms the Court's 
previous rulings that a contractor/builder/seller of a residence owes an independent tort 
duty to a home buyer. 
The trial court, in a very detailed Ruling and Order, held that Davencourt does not 
dispose of the rule that a builder, seller and general contractor that is in direct contractual 
privity with a buyer owes an independent duty to that buyer. (R. 1624-1640). 
Jury Instruction Number 38 sets forth the basic elements of negligence: (1) that 
Mr. Yates was negligent; (2) that Plaintiffs were harmed; and (3) that the Mr. Yates's 
negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs harm. (R. 1400-1443). In their 
verdict, the jury clearly determined that Mr. Yates was negligent in the design, 
construction and sale of the Residence which is the subject of this litigation. 
In discussing the economic loss rule in Davencourt, this Court noted that an 
independent duty creates an exception to the economic loss rule. (2009 UT 65 at f 27). 
"In the context of construction defect cases, Utah courts have found independent duties in 
a variety of relationships." (Id. at j^ 28 (see cases cited in fn. 4, including Yazd v. 
Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, \ 35, 143 P.3d 283 (holding that a contractor-seller 
owes a home purchaser "a duty to disclose information known to him concerning real 
property"); Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ffl[ 14, 22-23, 48 P.3d 235 (imposing an 
independent duty to disclose "known material defects on real estate agents based on their 
statutory duty to be "honest, ethical, and competent" and their "direct relationship" with 
purchasers); Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App. 101, If 36, 158 P.3d 562 (ruling that a 
contractor-seller owes a duty to disclose material information to home purchaser).) 
This Court in Davencourt held that a contractor/seller owes an independent duty to 
a home purchaser if the contractor/seller has a high degree of knowledge and expertise 
with regard to residential construction and if the home purchaser has a direct relationship 
with the contractor/seller. (2009 UT 65 at ^ 30). 
It is undisputed that Mr. Yates was the contractor/builder/seller of the subject 
residence. As set forth above, Mr. Yates had a high degree of knowledge and expertise 
with regard to residential construction, as he personally constructed 18 to 25 projects, 
including 9 to 11 residential projects, in his 25-30 year career as a general contractor. 
(R.397-415 and Exhibit "A," thereto at, p.l 1 -12.) It is also undisputed that Mr. Yates had 
a direct relationship with the Reighards as he was the seller of the Residence. 
Thus, the Davencourt case is factually distinguishable because the plaintiff 
homeowners association had no contractual relationship with the defendants, the 
developer and builder of the project. (Id. at \ 22) In the present case, the Reighards 
purchased their residence directly from Mr. Yates, the builder/contractor/seller. 
Therefore, Mr. Yates owed the Reighards an independent duty, which even 
Davencoart recognizes creates an exception to the economic loss rule. 
Mr. Yates's analysis of the Davencourt case misses this explanation entirely and 
instead focuses on issues from the case that are irrelevant to the present case. For 
instance, the fact that the court in Davencourt noted that Utah does not recognize an 
independent duty to conform to the building code is not relevant because the source of 
Mr. Yates's independent duty in the present case arises from his relationship to the 
Reighards as the builder/contractor/seller of the residence. In the present case, the failure 
to conform to the building codes is a breach of Mr. Yates' independent duty as the 
contractor/builder/seller of the residence. 
Thus, the Reighards' negligence claims were properly submitted to the jury and 
should not have been set aside. 
III. THE REIGHARDS PRESENTED ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF 
PERSONAL INJURIES, BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
WAS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE OF MR. YATESf INDEPENDENT DUTY TO 
THE REIGHARDS 
As set forth in detail above, the economic loss rule is inapplicable to this case, 
because Mr. Yates owed the Reighards an independent duty separate and apart from his 
contractual duties. In any event, the economic loss rule is additionally inapplicable to 
this matter because the Reighards claimed and presented evidence of personal injuries. 
More specifically, the Reighards experienced chronic physical injuries due to mold 
infestation in the Residence caused by water intrusion. 
Generally, the economic loss rule prevents a party from claiming economic 
damages in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury. {SME Indus., 
Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assoc, Inc., 2001 UT 54,^ } 32, 28 P.3d 669). 
The Reighards presented evidence at trial of the personal injuries and illness which 
Alan and Aidan Reighard suffered, which is itself directly attributable to Mr. Yates' 
substandard and negligent workmanship in the construction of the Residence. (R.1627) 
This includes that fact that starting in approximately late 2005 through August 
2006 (when the mold was discovered and Plaintiffs left the Residence), Alan Reighard 
experienced the following physical symptoms: headaches, fevers, sweating, pressure pain 
in ears, congestion, hoarse voice, sinus pain, drenching sweats and allergic reactions. 
(R.478-482 at \ 13). Aidan Reighard experienced the following physical symptoms 
starting in approximately late 2005 through August 2006: allergic reactions, including 
severe black eyes and rashes on his face, arms, legs and back, as well as congestion. 
(R.478-482 at ^ f 13). 
Dr. Brian Drage testified that since the remediation of the Residence in November 
2006, he has never seen Alan Reighard, as his primary care physician, with symptoms as 
severe and serious as they were in 2005 and 2006. (R.1700 at p. 61). Dr. Cole also 
confirmed that the exposure to the Reighards to such a degraded air quality in the 
Residence caused or substantially contributed to adverse and chronic health effects 
exhibited by Alan and Aidan Reighard and for which they sought medical care and 
treatment over a meaningful period of time. (R.1700 at p. 36). 
The jury clearly understood that Reighards suffered personal injuries as the jury 
found that the Reighards had suffered both economic and non-economic loss and 
awarded them damages accordingly. (R. 1444-1449). The jury separately compensated 
the Reighards for pain and suffering, a non-economic damage. (R. 1444-1449). There 
was no special instruction given to the jury (or offered by Mr. Yates) that causation of 
personal injury damages had to be proved by a reasonable medical certainty. (R.1400-
1443). 
Thus, the presence of the Reighards' bodily injuries does not prevent the 
Reighards from claiming economic damages, and the Reighards were not barred by the 
economic loss rule. 
It is noteworthy that the only expert witness that Mr. Yates designated and called 
at the time of trial was an alleged mold expert being flown in from Maryland. Mr. Yates 
produced no experts to dispute the facts presented that Mr. Yates breached his already 
established duty of due care to the Reighards, causing the damages to the Residence that 
needed to be removed, remediated and replaced for thousands of dollars. Mr. Yates's 
hyper-focus on the argument that the Reighards were not sick because of the mold and 
dry rot, or were not sick enough, is a myopic perspective that has no place in this lawsuit 
in light of the trial court's prior finding of the existence of an independent duty between 
Mr. Yates and the Reighards discussed above. 
IV. DR. EUGENE COLE, WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AS 
AN EXPERT WITNESS REGARDING HEALTH EFFECTS RESULTING FROM 
EXPOSURE TO MOLD 
Dr. Eugene Cole was clearly qualified to testify on all areas on which he was 
designated by the Reighards and the trial court correctly allowed him to so testify. Mr. 
Yates' arguments as to what Dr. Cole can and cannot properly testify to is merely 
unsupported conjecture. 
Dr. Eugene Cole (a professor at Brigham Young University) testified at trial that 
his undergraduate degree is in biological science and his two graduate degrees in public 
health. (R.1700 at p. 7). Dr. Cole's first graduate degree, a master's in public health 
microbiology, specifically focuses on microorganisms (bacteria, fungus, etc.) "and their 
potential to cause adverse health effects in humans...and an understanding of diagnosis 
and treatment." (R.1700 at p. 7). Dr. Cole's second graduate degree is a doctorate 
degree in public health, with an focus on biological agents, including "environmental 
circumstances, various risk factors and then adverse human health effects in individuals, 
families, large populations and so forth." (R.1700 at p. 7-8). Like a medical doctor, a 
doctor of public health is also educated and trained in terms of human disease, causative 
factors, etc. (R.1700 at p. 10). 
Dr. Cole reviewed the medical records for Alan and Aidan Reighard. (R. 1700 at 
p. 11). Dr Cole reviewed at least the deposition transcripts of Suzy Reighard, Dr. Brian 
Drage, Dr. Henry, photographs, the report from Environmental Solutions regarding mold 
sampling, reports from remediators at the Residence, and the reports from Service 
Masters and Bio-clean. (R.1700 at p. 39). This is clearly material which Dr. Cole can 
properly base his opinions on. Dr. Cole even visited the Reighards' Residence. 
Mr. Yates argues that "many of the articles" Dr. Cole cited are somehow not 
generally accepted by the relevant expert community, but fails to identify which articles 
or who the relevant expert community even is, and the argument is thus baseless. (Brief 
of Appellant at p. 29). 
Interestingly, counsel for Mr. Yates made it clear at trial during his voir dire of Dr. 
Cole that he was only objecting to the qualifications of Dr. Cole in regards to Dr. Cole's 
ability to testify as to causation regarding particular individuals, and even noted that he 
did not "have a problem with him talking cause and affect in groups." (R.1700 at p. 13-
14). However, now in the Brief of Appellant, Mr. Yates attempts to challenge Dr. Cole's 
qualifications regarding diagnosis, or more generally, the health effects of human 
contract with mold in a residential setting. (Brief of Appellant at P. 26.) Mr. Yates 
attempts to further challenge Dr. Cole's qualifications by asserting that he may be 
qualified to testify from a public health standpoint, but not from a medical standpoint. 
(Brief of Appellant at P. 27.) Aside from the fact that these challenges to Dr. Cole's 
qualifications are completely unsupported, they have been waived by Mr. Yates, as his 
counsel narrowly set forth his objections to Dr. Cole's qualifications. 
As to the specific issue of causation, conspicuously absent from the Brief of 
Appellant is Dr. Cole's testimony during counsel for Mr. Yates' voir dire whereby Dr. 
Cole confirmed that as a doctor of public health, he is qualified to provide opinions as 
to the effect of mold on a particular individual or set of individuals, and that would not. 
be a medical diagnosis. (R. 1700 at p. 12-13). 
Dr. Cole further went on to testify that in his professional opinion, "there's a 
substantial likelihood of causation or significant contribution to those health defects from 
the environmental conditions associated with what I have determined to be chronic water 
intrusion and resultant mold contamination in the Reighard home." (R.1700 at p. 23). 
Dr. Cole also confirmed that the exposure to the Reighards to such a degraded air 
quality in the Residence caused or substantially contributed to adverse and chronic health 
effects exhibited by Alan and Aidan Reighard and for which they sought medical care 
and treatment over a meaningful period of time. (R.1700 at p. 36). 
Mr. Yates attempted to strike Dr. Cole's testimony in this regard pursuant to a 
motion to strike Dr. Cole's affidavit on or about April 28, 2008 (approximately one and 
half years before trial) and a motion to exclude Dr. Cole's testimony filed on August 4, 
2009. (R.981) The trial court denied Mr. Yates' motions. 
Mr. Yates' continued issues regarding Dr. Cole's testimony go to the weight of his 
testimony, not its admissibility, and Dr. Cole was thus properly allowed to testify by the 
trial court. 
Mr. Yates takes issue that Dr. Cole could not testify as to specific details about the 
mold in the Residence. However, Dr. Cole testified that the creation of the mold due to 
water intrusion can be a slow, cumulative process. (R.1700 at p. 29). Dr. Drage testified 
that since the remediation of the Residence in November 2006, he has never seen Alan 
Reighard, as his primary care physician, with symptoms as severe and serious as they 
were in 2005 and 2006. (R.1700 at p. 61). 
Dr. Drage testified that Dr. Henry (an allergist) tested Aidan Reighard or common 
household molds, not outside molds or stachybotris, and such tests came back negative. 
(R.1700 at p. 60). As set forth above, such tests were something which Dr. Cole relied on 
in providing his testimony. Dr. Drage admittedly testified that he could not establish, 
with a reasonable medical certainty that there was a causal connection between Aidan's 
symptoms and the mold at the Residence, only because he saw Aidan just once and is 
thus unable to make that connection. (R. 1700 at p. 65). 
Mr. Yates9 sole expert, Dr. Hung Cheung, admitted that there was mold in the 
Residence, (R.1701 at p. 155). However, Dr. Cheung did not review any photographs of 
the mold in the Residence, nor did he ask to review any photographs of mold in the house 
(R.1701 at p. 155). When shown a photograph of the mold that existed in the Residence, 
Dr. Cheung admitted that in his professional opinion, the mold in the ReighardsJ 
residence needed to be removed from the Residence, (R.1701 at p. 155). Dr, Cheung 
further admitted that the mix of molds that Allan and Aidan Reighard were tested for did 
not include a Stachybotrys mold. (R.1701 at p. 159). 
Again, Mr. Yates did not put forth evidence, through an expert or otherwise, 
where the mold originated from at the Residence or when it occurred. However, even 
Mr. Yates' own expert acknowledged that there was mold that needed to be removed. 
Shaan Sanderson testified that the fact that the grading in the backyard of the Residence 
(which Mr. Yates performed) is up close or in contact with the stucco system is a 
building code violation which contributed to the water intrusion to the house. (R. 1700 p. 
81) Therefore, Mr. Yates' argument that there was a "possibility" that the airborne mold 
originated "from the bathroom carpet or some other source" is unsupported. (Brief of 
Appellant at fn. 9). Similarly, Mr. Yates' theory that the sprinklers caused the mold at 
the Residence is completely unsupported. Shaan Sanderson testified that if the stucco 
system at the Residence was properly installed originally, it would withstand overspray 
from the adjacent sprinklers. (R.1700 p. 117). 
V. THE REIGHARDS WERE PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS AS PART 
OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT 
The Reighards' were properly awarded $2,919.25 in costs by the trial court in the 
Amended Judgment as set forth herein (again, none of which has been paid by Mr. Yates 
to the Reighards), even though the Reighards argue in their cross-appeal that they should 
have been awarded more. 
However, it must first be noted that Mr. Yates cannot and could never have been 
awarded any costs in this matter, as Mr. Yates completely failed to raise this issue at the 
trial court level. In fact, Mr. Yates never motioned the trial court for attorney's fees or 
costs, whatsoever. 
Mr. Yates never filed a memorandum of costs. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(2), Mr. Yates was required to claim his costs within five days after the 
entry of judgment by filing and serving the Reighards with a copy of a memorandum of 
the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a 
like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are 
correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. As this was never done, Mr. Yates has waived his right to costs. 
Furthermore, Mr. Yates is incorrect wrong regarding his interpretation of Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 68.3 Mr. Yates contends that he served an Offer of Judgment to 
the Reighards on September 17, 2007 pursuant to Rule 68 in the amount of $10,000 
which was not accepted by the Reighards. (Brief of Appellant at p. 32). As previously 
mentioned, the trial court reduced the jury's verdict to the Reighards from $12,500 to 
$7,500. Mr. Yates argues that since the $7,500 award is less than the $10,000 offer of 
judgment that Mr. Yates "should not have been responsible to pay the Reighards any 
costs incurred after the Offer of Judgment." (again, none of which have actually been 
paid to the Reighards). The argument is inaccurate. 
If the jury's award was not reduced to $7,500, Mr. Yates clearly would not be 
making this argument. Even assuming that the reduction in the jury's award to $7,500 
was proper by the trial court (which is disputed by the Reighards in this Cross-Appeal), 
an assuming that the joint offer to the Reighards was proper (which the Reighards 
dispute), the Reighards' "adjusted award" eclipses and is more favorable than Mr. Yates' 
$10,000 Offer of Judgment, and therefore Mr. Yates is responsible to pay the costs which 
the Reighards were awarded. 
Costs, interest and attorney's fees were not excluded by Mr. Yates' offer of 
judgment. (Addendum to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit "2."). Pursuant to Rule 68(d), if 
2
 The text of Rule 54 is set forth herein in the Determinative Authority, supra, p. 4-7. 
3
 The text of Rule 68 is set forth herein in the Determinative Authority, supra, p. 3-4. 
these items are not excluded from an Offer of Judgment, the amount awarded by the 
finder of fact (even assuming the $7,500) is adjusted to include these figures incurred 
before the offer. (Rule 68 (d).) 
Between when Complaint was filed in February 1, 2007, and when Mr. Yates 
made his Offer of Judgment on September 17, 2007, it is undisputed that the Reighards 
incurred $505 in filing/pro hac vice fees, plus $75 injury fees. (R.1473-1477) These 
amounts, added to the $7,500 reduced award equals $8,080. 
As to attorney's fees, the Reighards set forth evidence in their Motion for 
Attorney's fees that from the inception of the litigation through approximately October, 
2009 (approximately two and a half years), the Reighards incurred a total of 
approximately $277,100 in attorney's fees and $13,214.95 in expert expenses. (R.1450-
1472). Considering attorney's fees alone, that averages to approximately $8,659 per 
month. It thus cannot reasonably be disputed that the Reighards incurred at least 
$1,921.00 (approximately eight hours at $250 per hour) in attorney's fees from between 
January 2007 through September 2007. The $1,921.00 added to the $8,070 equals 
$10,001. Thus, the relevant "Adjusted Award" pursuant to Rule 68(d), taking into 
account the $7,500 award plus costs and attorney's fees incurred to the date of the offer, 
was more favorable than Mr. Yates $10,000 offer of judgment to the Reighards. As such, 
the Reighards were properly awarded costs by the trial court. 
VI. MR. YATES WAS CLEARLY NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY AND 
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AS MR. YATES 
NEVER MOTIONED THE TRIAL COURT FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Again, Mr. Yates completely failed to raise this issue at the trial court level and in 
fact never motioned the trial court for attorney's fees or costs. Thus, the Reighards were 
never given the opportunity to respond to such a request, and Mr. Yates failed to produce 
any evidence of the amount of attorney's fees that he could possibly be seeking. 
In any event, generally, there can only be one prevailing party. (See R.T. Nielson 
Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 P.3d 1119.) The Reighards' arguments and authority below 
that they are indeed the prevailing party, and that Mr. Yates cannot be the prevailing 
party are incorporated herein by reference. 
In any event, as mentioned above, the jury determined that the Reighards were the 
prevailing party in this litigation and rendered a verdict in their favor in the amount of 
$ 12,500. Mr. Yates failed to avoid an adverse judgment and therefore cannot be the 
prevailing party. Further, because Mr. Yates did not assert any counterclaims against the 
Reighards, the Mr. Yates did not receive any monetary relief which would be relevant for 
a determination of who received the "net" monetary judgment. Rather, the Reighards 
were awarded the only monetary relief in this action. 
Also relevant to the determination that Mr. Yates cannot be deemed the prevailing 
party in this litigation is the fact that Mr. Yates failed to obtain a more favorable award 
than Plaintiffs' statutory Offer to Compromise. On June 24, 2008, the Reighards served 
Mr. Yates with a statutory Offer to Compromise ("Offer") pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68 in the amount of $5,000. (R.1454-1472 at Exhibit "2" attached thereto). 
Mr. Yates never accepted the Offer, and therefore it was deemed rejected by Mr. 
Yates by operation of law. At trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Plaintiffs in the 
amount of $12,500, which is over twice as much than their $5,000 Offer. Mr. Yates 
failed to receive a more favorable award than the $5,000 Offer and therefore cannot be 
deemed a prevailing party in this litigation. In fact, the Reighards would not be liable to 
Mr. Yates for costs, prejudgment interests or attorney's fees which were incurred by Mr. 
Yates after the Offer pursuant to Rule 68(b). 
Also, Mr. Yates' argument that his success in defending the Reighards' fraud 
claims should be taken into account in determining the prevailing party is not supported 
by any authority. 
In any event, it should be clear that Mr. Yates has made this a "make work" case, 
as demonstrated by the sheer volume of motions in limine, motions for summary 
judgment, motions to exclude, and motions to strike which he has filed in this matter. 
Thus, any award of attorney's fees which Mr. Yates could possibly seek would be 
patently unreasonable. Even Rule 68(b) recognizes that the court may suspend the 
application of the rule to prevent manifest injustice. 
ARGUMENT REGARDING ISSUES RAISED IN THIS CROSS-APPEAL 
I. THE REIGHARDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO BE THE 
PREVAILING PARTY IN THIS LITIGATION PURSUANT TO THE REPC AND 
APPLICABLE LAW AND WERE THUS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
As set forth above, in actuality, the Reighards were the "prevailing party" in this 
case and were entitled to recover their attorney's fees and costs, including expert 
expenses, pursuant to the subject Real Estate Purchase Contract and the applicable Utah 
case law, which provides that when a plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a 
common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least some of its 
claims, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all attorney's fees and costs 
reasonably incurred in the litigation. 
The trial court found that Mr. Yates was clearly not the prevailing party in this 
litigation, but refused to deem the Reighards the prevailing party even though they were 
the only parties in whose favor a judgment was rendered.(R. 1630-1631). As such, the 
Reighards should be awarded their attorney's fees and costs, including expert expenses. 
On or about February 5, 2004, Mr. Yates entered into the REPC with the 
Reighards for the sale of the Residence. (Addendum to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit "1") 
Section 17 of the REPC sets forth the following provision: 
"17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding 
arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs 
and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for 
participation in mediation under Section 15." 
It is clear that, "attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or 
contract." {Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App. 101,158 P.3d 562, 577 (citing Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 164 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).). Therefore, the trial court had 
authority to award costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing party in this litigation as 
authorized by Section 17 of the REPC. 
1Q 
"Where a contract or statute provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party, a 
party does not even become entitled to such fees until the jury has determined which 
party has prevailed in the case." (Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 
(Utah 1998).) It is apparent that the jury determined and intended that the Reighards 
prevailed in this litigation as against Mr. Yates. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term 
'prevailing party5 as: "/i party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the 
amount of damages awarded (in certain cases, the court will award attorney fees to the 
prevailing party). Also termed successful party." (A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and 
Heating v. Guy, UT App 73, f^ 11, 47 P.3d 92, 95 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1145 
(7th ed.1999)) (emphasis added). 
The jury specifically determined that the Reighards prevailed in this litigation 
when it found Mr. Yates liable for negligence in the amount of $12,500. Judgment was 
thereafter entered in that amount in favor of the Reighards and against Mr. Yates. Utah 
case law supports the conclusion that the Reighards are the "prevailing party" for purpose 
of an award of attorney's fees. 
In Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, the court noted that, "Typically, 
determining the 'prevailing party' for purposes of awarding fees and costs is quite simple. 
Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if plaintiff is awarded a judgment, 
plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant successfully defends and avoids an adverse 
judgment, defendant has prevailed." (Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 
P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1989).)(emphasis added) 
In the matter at hand, the Reighards sued Mr. Yates for money damages and were 
awarded a judgment accordingly. Yes, there were multiple causes of action, but all of the 
causes of action, including those for negligence and breach of contract, stemmed from a 
common core of facts and legal theories. Therefore, the Reighards are the prevailing 
party. 
The Mountain States Court discussed the issue regarding whether a prevailing 
party is the one who received a "net" monetary judgment in the underlying action. "We 
hold that in the present circumstances the party in whose favor the "net" judgment is 
entered must be considered the 'prevailing party' and is entitled to an award of its fees." 
Id. at 556. However, unlike Mountain States, which involved both the plaintiff and 
defendant receiving some monetary relief, here, the Reighards are the only ones who 
received a monetary judgment, and the issue of who received a "net" judgment is quite 
simple. The Reighards succeeded at the trial as against Mr. Yates who asserted no 
counterclaims against the Reighards. Therefore, the Reighards were the only parties to 
receive a monetary recovery in this action and they are thus the prevailing party as matter 
of law and for purposes of an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
The case of Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp. controlling in the present 
circumstances. In Dejavue, the court noted that, when a plaintiff brings multiple claims 
involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least 
some of its claims, it is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in the litigation. (Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, 993 
P.2d 222, 227.)(emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that the Reighards brought multiple claims involving a common 
core of facts and related legal theories in this litigation. The common core of facts 
centered around Defendant's role as the builder, general contractor and seller of the 
Residence, all of which created a duty between the Reighards and Mr. Yates as a matter 
of law. Mr. Yates' failure to comply with building codes during the construction of the 
home and surrounding grading, caused the very damages claimed in each cause of action 
plead by the Reighards. 
As mentioned above, the Reighards legal theories were all related, and the filing of 
the Complaint, as a whole, was directed toward Mr. Yates' duties regarding building code 
violations, construction defects and failures to disclose at the Residence. Further, the 
Reighards were awarded $12,500 on their Negligence claim against Mr. Yates. 
Therefore, according to the holding in Dejavue, the Reighards, by virtue of their success 
at trial, are entitled to compensation for all attorney's fees reasonably incurred in the 
litigation. Accordingly, the Reighards are not required to produce an allocation of those 
attorney's fees and costs expended merely on prosecuting the successful Negligence 
cause of action. Rather, Plaintiffs are entitled to the full amount of their attorney's fees 
and costs. 
In addition, Section 17 of the REPC also provides authority of an award of "costs" 
to a prevailing party. The Reighards should thus be awarded all of their costs in this 
litigation, including their expert costs, pursuant to the REPC. The Reighards as a 
prevailing party are already entitled to a statutory award of taxable costs. aIn order not to 
render the term 'costs' superfluous, the Contract should be read to include those costs 
that were associated with the litigation but would not be included under a regular Rule 
54(d) cost award." {Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, 38 P.3d 1001, 1006.) The 
Reighards' expert costs are such that were associated with the litigation but are not 
included as "taxable costs" under a regular Rule 54(d) cost award. Therefore, The 
Reighards should also be awarded their expert costs pursuant to their status as a 
prevailing party in connection with Section 17 of the REPC. 
The Reighards set forth evidence at the trial court level that over the course of the 
two and a half year litigation, the Reighards incurred a total of approximately 
$277,100.00 in attorney's fees and $13,214.95 in expert expenses. (R.1450-1472) 
Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that there was no prevailing party in the 
litigation, the Reighards should have been deemed the prevailing party and should have 
been awarded their attorney's fees and costs in at least the amount of 277,100.00 in 
attorney's fees and $13,214.95 in expert expenses. If this Court holds that the trial court 
so erred in not awarding the Reighards attorney's fees and costs, the Reighards reserve all 
rights to seek an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred through appeal of this matter 
pursuant to Section 17 of the REPC and applicable law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF THE 
JURY'S VERDICT FROM $12,500 to $7,500 BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT THE 
JURY FOUND THAT MR. YATES' PERSONAL NEGLIGENCE CAUSED THE 
REIGHARDS' DAMAGES 
As set forth above, the jury's award to the Reighards was reduced from $12,500 to 
$7,500, ostensibly because the trial court felt that Mr. Yates should somehow receive a 
$5,000 offset from the monies in settlement which the Reighards received from the 
stucco subcontractor, E. Marshall Plastering. It is noteworthy that E. Marshall Plastering 
was named in a third-party complaint by Mr. Yates, but then subsequently dismissed by 
him before trial (and was not named as a third-party defendant by Mr. Yates at the time 
Mr. Yates served his Offer of Judgment). 
There is no appropriate basis for which the Court can make a reduction of the 
jury's verdict. Oddly, the trial court initially agreed that there was insufficient evidence 
to allow the jury to speculate what E. Marshall Plastering did wrong, as the jury did not 
know who did what flashing or who installed the building paper. (R.1701 p. 183) Thus, 
the trial court's subsequent reduction of the jury's award of $12,500 is improper. 
The evidence at trial revealed that Mr. Yates himself performed the grading at the 
residence, and Mr. Yates admitted he "eyeballed" the grading of the residence. Plaintiffs 
argued at trial that Mr. Yates was negligent in his grading of the residence. Plaintiffs also 
presented evidence that Mr. Yates was negligent in constructing the residence in violation 
of the building code, including inadequate framing and window flashing. There was no 
specification by the jury, other than the general umbrella of "Property damage to 
residence," as to what aspect of Mr. Yates's negligence supported their award of 
economic loss damages to Plaintiffs. (R. 1444-1449). 
As mentioned above, Mr. Yates did not call any expert witnesses regarding 
construction or stucco installation. Thus, Mr. Yates did not produce any evidence to 
support his burden of proof that some other subcontractor was negligent. The jury never 
determined any allocation of damages related to the various defect claims and potentially 
implicated subcontractors (i.e., stucco, framing, window installation, window 
manufacture). (R. 1444-1449). 
It is entirely plausible that the jury rendered its verdict solely on Mr. Yates's own 
negligent grading of the residence. The jury's verdict does not reveal what amount was 
attributable to the defective stucco at the residence. However, what is certain is that the 
jury heard evidence that Mr. Yates employed a multitude of subcontractors in the 
construction of the residence, and despite this, the jury still found Mr. Yates 
independently negligent. Furthermore, Jury Instruction No. 31 asked the jury to evaluate 
Mr. Yates own individual negligence. (R. 1400-1443). 
Apportionment of negligence among the parties is a factual matter best left to the 
trial court's determination. (See Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 1981).) At 
trial, the Court properly determined that the Special Jury Instructions and Special Verdict 
Form should not contain an allocation of fault to E. Marshall Plastering or even name it. 
(R.1444-1449). 
There is a "legislative intent that defendants wishing to have their fault compared 
with nonparties join such nonparties.. .or bear the burden if such people cannot be 
joined." (Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1998).) Interpreting the 
Field decision, the United States District Court noted, "Field denies the joint tortfeasor an 
opportunity to seek allocation of fault in the trial of the underlying tort unless it has first 
joined a codefendant by means of a third-party complaint for apportionment." 
(Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Queen Carpet Corp, 5 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1250 (D.Utah 1998).) Mr. Yates cannot now 
obtain an offset from an "empty chair" which Mr. Yates himself made unavailable. 
The jury determined that the fault attributable to Mr. Yates is $12,500. 
Therefore, there is no appropriate basis for which the trial court could make a 
reduction of the jury's verdict, and the reduction of $5,000 should be set aside by this 
Court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT RE-OPENING THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE JURY'S VERDICT AND THEREAFTER 
DIRECTING THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN THE REIGHARDS1 FAVOR ON 
THEIR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
The Reighards moved the trial court post-trial to re-open the judgment and direct 
entry of judgment in the Reighards favor on their breach of contract and negligence 
misrepresentation causes of action, which wras denied. 
As the seller of the Residence and pursuant to the REPC, Mr. Yates was obligated 
to make disclosures concerning material deficiencies in the construction of the Residence, 
including water intrusion issues, faulty construction, grading issues and building code 
violations (as set forth above, the knowledge of which is imputed to Mr. Yates as the 
builder/general contractor). 
Because knowledge is imputed to builders and contractors, the Reighards did not 
have to prove that Mr. Yates had actual knowledge of the construction defects at the 
Residence, (Yazd v Woodside Homes Corp , 2006 UT 47, ^38, 158 P.3d 562, 574.) Mr. 
Yates's testimony that he did not have actual knowledge of the defects and various 
building code violations because he did not supervise the work and he relied upon his 
subcontractors and the city to do their jobs is not legally persuasive. As the general 
contractor, the law imputes on Mr. Yates a high degree of specialized knowledge and 
expertise with regard to the construction of the Residence he built and sold, and thus Mr. 
Yates's failure to actually recognize the defects, violations and substandard workmanship 
is simply not a viable legal defense. 
As part of the REPC, Mr. Yates executed a Seller's Property Condition Disclosure 
("the Seller's Disclosure"). Regarding the following disclosure of defects, among others, 
Mr. Yates marked "No" on the Seller's Disclosure regarding problems with the exterior of 
the Residence including but not limited to moisture behind stucco. (Addendum to Brief of 
Appellant at Exhibit "1"). Mr. Yates's "disclosures" (or lack thereof) that he essentially 
knew of no building bode violations or items such as moisture behind stucco. The failure 
to disclose constitutes either affirmative misrepresentations and/or material omissions, 
and further, Mr. Yates breached the terms of the REPC by failing to disclose to the 
Reighards the true condition and habitability of the Residence. Thus, the jury should have 
awarded the Reighards damages on their breach of contract and negligence 
misrepresentation causes of action. 
In addition, there was no evidence presented at trial that Plaintiffs failed to do 
substantially all of the things the REPC required them to do. The most likely conclusion 
for the jury's finding that Mr. Yates did not breach the REPC is that the jury did not 
understand the Special Verdict Form as it pertained to the concept of Plaintiffs' 
obligations under the REPC This conclusion is substantiated by the jury's response to 
the Special Verdict Form in this matter, whereby the jury answered "No" to whether, 
"Did Plaintiffs do all, or substantially all, of the things the contract required them to do or 
were plaintiffs excused from performing their contractual obligations?" (R. 1444-1449). 
The catalyst for such jury confusion was undoubtedly that counsel for Defendant, 
during closing argument, which is not evidence, argued that Plaintiffs failed to comply 
with the mediation provision in the REPC at Section 15. The Reighards fully complied 
with the mediation provision as specifically detailed and demonstrated by the Reighards. 
(R. 1454-1472 and Exhibits 3 through 8 thereto). In short, the Reighards undertook 
extensive efforts on numerous occasions both before and after the filing of the Complaint 
to engage in good faith settlement discussions and mediation with Mr. Yates. 
In any event, Mr. Yates never sought to compel Plaintiffs' compliance with 
Section 15. Whether there was in fact compliance, or whether compliance with Section 
15 of the REPC was even required, is a matter of law for the Court to have decided, and 
the issue was not put before the Court until closing arguments at trial before the jury. 
Thus, the jury was left to surmise that Plaintiffs themselves had failed to perform their 
contractual obligations under the REPC. 
As a matter of law, the fact that this litigation was not submitted to mediation prior 
to the filing of the Complaint does not render the REPC unenforceable. (See Miller 
Family Real Estate, LLC v. Hajizadeh, 2008 UT App 475, \ 6, 200 P.3d 213, 215.) 
Therefore, the trial court erred in not re-opening the judgment entered on the jury's 
verdict and direct entry of judgment in the Reighards favor on their breach of contract 
and negligence misrepresentation causes of action, and this Court should correct its error. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
As set forth above, Mr. Yates clearly had an independent duty to the Reighards, as 
he was the builder, general contractor and the seller of the Residence and the trial court 
did not err in so holding. This Court's opinion in Davencourt does not change the result 
as Mr. Yates and the parties were in contractual privity in this matter. Therefore, the 
economic loss rule does not apply to bar the Reighards' negligence claim. In addition, 
the economic loss rule is inapplicable as the Reighards presented evidence of personal 
injuries suffered by Alan and Aidan Reighard, which was recognized by the trial court. 
As to Dr. Cole's testimony, he was qualified to render the opinions given and the trial 
court properly allowed him to testify. The court properly awarded the Reighards costs in 
the Amended Judgment and Mr. Yates could not possibly have been awarded costs as this 
issue was not raised at the trial court level. Similarly, Mr. Yates was not and could not 
have been the prevailing party (as recognized by the trial court) and should not have been 
awarded attorney's fees, especially since he never motion the court for them. 
In their cross-appeal, the Reighards request that this Court reverse the trial court's 
determination that there was no prevailing party and award the Reighards their attorney's 
fees and costs; reverse the trial court's reduction of the jury's award to $7,500; and re-
open the amended judgment and enter judgment in the Reighards favor on their breach 
of contract and negligent misrepresentation causes of action. 
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